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Markets for endangered species potentially generate incentives for both legal supply
and poaching. To deter poaching, governments can spend on enforcement or
increase legal harvesting to reduce the return from poaching. A leader–follower
commitment game is developed to examine these choices in the presence of illegal
harvesting and the resulting impacts on species stocks. In addition, current trade
restrictions imposed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora are examined. With Cournot conjectures among
poachers, the model details the subgame perfect equilibrium interactions between
poaching levels, enforcement and legal harvesting.
 
1. Introduction and background
 
While habitat destruction and transformation has been considered the lead-
ing factor in endangering species, several high-proﬁle extinctions have been
the direct result of over-harvesting, and many other currently endangered
species are subject to harvesting for international trade. CITES, the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, was enacted in March 1973 in an attempt to ensure that species
do not become extinct as a result of such harvesting. Under the Convention,
species listed in Appendix I (such as the giant panda, tiger, and Australian
dugong) are subject to complete bans on international trade, while those in
Appendix II (including the bottle-nosed dolphin, whale shark, and black
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spider monkey) tend to have less severe restrictions on trade, including
quotas on harvests and customs requirements.
While the actual hunting or gathering of species may be relatively simple
and subject to open-access, the poaching of endangered species for sale in
foreign markets is potentially limited to those with the resources and con-
nections to transport and sell plants or animals internationally without
being easily caught (likely more so for trade in live animals). This implies
that previous models of wildlife management, predominantly characterised
by either perfect competition or a single user (monopoly), do not always
accurately portray the realities of wildlife poaching. Imperfect competition
among poachers, where individual poachers have some impact on prices,
would be a more appropriate modelling choice for many species markets.
The use of game theory allows the interaction between poachers to be
explicitly modelled in order to better describe how these agents will
respond to the actions of their competitor poachers and to the harvesting
and enforcement decisions of the government. Speciﬁcally, quantity (or
Cournot) competition among poachers is employed in the present paper,
where each poacher independently selects their own harvest and that harv-
est interacts with the legally sanctioned harvest and the harvests of other
poachers through the price of the good, and can also be affected by
enforcement through the expected punishment of being caught. Hence, the
present paper examines two distinct policy options available to concerned
governments of countries with harvested endangered species. The ﬁrst is to
use physical or monetary resources for protected areas, guards, special cus-
toms ofﬁcers, and the like, in order to increase the probability of catching
illegal harvesters, thereby increasing the expected ﬁne/punishment for
poaching. The second deterrence method is to sanction the provision of
species to the market, driving down the price and, therefore, the return to
poaching.
Modelling the choice of the legal harvest of the government simultane-
ously with the harvest choice of poachers would result in a market char-
acterised by perfect competition (unless the legal costs and beneﬁts are
substantially different from those of poachers). The government would be
a single producer among many, each without the capacity to signiﬁcantly
affect the price. Therefore, deterrence through higher legal harvests would
not be possible, as the price received by poachers would not change. If the
government were, instead, able to commit to particular harvest and en-
forcement levels prior to the decisions of poachers, the government could
have an impact on those decisions and be in a position to actively limit
(some) poaching with its wildlife management policy. For this purpose, the
government choice of harvest (or domestic legal quota if direct control is
not possible) and enforcement is here considered as the ﬁrst move in a 
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 Again, while certain species
markets may be better suited to a competitive open-access characterisation
(such as many commonly consumed ﬁsh species), many endangered species
or their parts cannot simply be taken across a nearby border and sold to an
end-user, but must be transported over long distances to countries with
strict import regulations; and, accordingly, their markets can more appro-
priately be modelled with a limited number of harvesters (or limited entry).
Australia, for example, is a major (legal) net exporter of crocodile skins and
importer of wild orchids (World Resources Institute 2000), as well as having
burgeoning illegal markets for macaws, palm cockatoos and other birds.
Open-access with illegal activity has received much more attention in the
published resource management literature, beginning with Anderson and
Lee (1986) and Milliman (1986), and more recently, Bulte and van Kooten
(1999), Burton (1999), Alexander (2000) and Kremer and Morcom (2000).
Limited entry with illegal activity has also been previously analysed by
Sutinen and Andersen (1985) and Crabbé and Long (1993). Both of these
papers abstract from pricing dynamics and focus on harvest decisions. In
the present paper, the goal is to simultaneously determine the levels of
enforcement, legal harvesting and poaching when poachers have some
degree of market power. Poachers act according to Cournot conjectures (so
there is no strategic collaboration), and choose their illegal harvests after
the government has set the legal harvest quantity or quota. In the context
of the proposed framework, the impact of the CITES policies on welfare,
poaching, enforcement and endangered species stocks is explicitly evaluated.





The remainder of the present paper describes the subgame perfect Nash
equilibria of the two-stage game. Backward induction, beginning with




  The international oil market can be thought of in the same way, with the Organisation
of Petroleum Exporting Countries cartel setting its own oil production for a period
and other small producing countries then choosing their own production levels. The





  African range states have shown mixed results after the ban, although many have
observed overall increases in elephant populations despite population pressures, civil wars,
habitat destruction and local killing in response to crop-raiding. Some nations, including
Cameroon, Malawi and Tanzania, have experienced lower estimated poaching after the
ban, while others, such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, have higher post-ban poaching estimates,
despite the fact that enforcement in terms of monetary expenditures have decreased in all
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game. In the second stage, detailed in section 2, the individual poachers
choose their harvest levels given the legal harvest and enforcement level set
by the government. In sections 3 and 4, the government chooses the legal
harvest and enforcement level under a pure proﬁt objective (section 3) and
a proﬁt-and-stock objective (section 4), accounting for how individual and
total poaching are affected by its decisions.
 
2. Individual and total poaching choice
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contribute nothing to the protection of habitat to maintain the species
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can be written as:
(1)
As in the above mentioned studies, the market for legal and illegal products
is the same: there is a single demand curve for the product in question,
independently of the method by which it is provided. A representative
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 0; that is, the probability of catching a
poacher is increasing in the government-chosen level of enforcement with
non-increasing returns.
The proﬁt-maximising condition, which yields the reaction function,
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(3)
Hence, poachers harvest until the beneﬁt from harvesting one additional
unit (the price received from output) equals the sum of the marginal cost of
harvesting that unit, the increase in the expected ﬁne and the proﬁt lost
through the resulting decrease in the price of output. Assuming a symmetric
Cournot equilibrium among poachers (as in Crabbé and Long 1993), the
reaction function for total poaching is:
(4)
where the total harvests by all poachers is:
(5)
by symmetry. The reaction function for total poaching, equation (4), shows
how total poaching is affected by the ﬁrst-stage government choice variables:










). The particular reactions to
these variables are provided below. Rearranging equation (4), total poaching
harvest can be written as
(6)




















as the denominator is negative. For poaching to not occur, the price associated
with the optimising legal harvest would then have to be lower than the sum
of the expected cost and punishment associated with the ﬁrst unit poached.
This could occur if: (i) legal harvesting has a signiﬁcant cost advantage
so that the legal harvest is large and the market price consequently low; or
(ii) enforcement is sufﬁciently high or effective so that the expected punishment
is high relative to the price.
Returning to the poaching choice and the poaching reaction function, we
can observe (by total differentiation of equation (6)) that the reaction of
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 Higher legal harvests inﬂuence poaching in
several ways; the most important being the price effects through the demand
function and cost effects through the stock-dependency of the poaching
cost functions. Furthermore, we know that total poaching decreases by less

























This follows from two elements: that individual ﬁrms can collectively exer-
cise some (possibly small but positive) degree of market power, and that
enforcement is effective, as
(9)
A decrease in legal offtake would then provide a price incentive to
expand poaching output; but, at the same time, enforcement imposes a cost
on poaching additional units. With a convex punishment function, the mar-
ginal expected punishment may be quite high. Enforcement effects partially
offset price effects and, as a result, poaching will increase, but not by the
full change in the legal harvest. For a given number of poachers and initial
stock, the reaction function for total poaching is downward sloping in both
enforcement and legal harvest, so enforcement and legal harvests are
poaching deterrents. In selecting the legal harvest (h
L) and enforcement
level (e) to maximise its objective, the government must take into account
these reactions of total poaching. Accordingly, we move to the ﬁrst stage of
the game, incorporating the reaction function for total poaching (equation
(4)) into the government objective; whether this be to maximise the returns
from the legal harvest (the following section) or from both the legal harvest
and the stock level (section 4).
3  The second order condition for poaching (divided by n) is phh(h
P)/n + ph/n + cs/n −
cssh
P/n − αγ″/n < 0, so that (when combined with ph < 0 and cs < 0) the denominator is
negative. In addition, the numerator is positive since the slope of marginal revenue is
less (or equal to) than the slope of the demand curve (which implies: –phhh
P – ph ≥ 0) and
css > 0.
4  In this case, the numerator is a subset of the denominator. The additional terms in the
denominator all have the same reinforcing sign (negative), making the denominator a larger
negative number. This implies that the entire R
L must be a fraction; hence, the absolute
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3. Stock-independent resource management
For the purposes of this section, we assume that the government maximises
the legal net return from the management of the stock; that is, the revenues
from legal harvesting sales and expected ﬁnes, less the costs of habitat pro-
tection and harvesting. This may be the case when control over harvesting
is made by a resource manager concerned only with the direct return from
the stock, and serves as a benchmark for the following section, where
welfare also depends on stock management.
5 To allow for differences in the
cost structures between the (identical) poachers and the legal harvesters, let
the legal harvest cost function be d(s)h
L. In addition to production costs,
we assume that there is an opportunity cost of land, so that higher stock
levels require additional habitat and take land from alternative uses. The
cost of habitat protection (l(s), inclusive of opportunity costs of land)
required to sustain a particular stock level is assumed to be increasing
in the stock at an increasing rate (ls > 0 and lss ≥ 0). Land costs serve to
decrease conservation incentives, whether the resource manager is concerned
with the stock level or not.
We consider the government to have either direct control over harvesting
or indirect control over the distribution of individual quotas, which sum
to the total legal harvest, h
L; the latter being consistent with Appendix
II of CITES. With quotas, distributive effects are ignored, so that the
government may freely distribute or charge a fee for the quotas; and the
legal  harvesting sector becomes passive in the sense that legal harvest
choices of individual ﬁrms are given by the distribution of quotas. Enforce-
ment capital, e, is purchased on a competitive international market at a
parametric price, r = 1. The total expected return from the stock is then
the difference between the revenues from the legal harvest and ﬁnes applied
to caught poachers and the costs of harvesting, enforcement and land
protection:
(10)
Maximisation of equation (10) with respect to h
L, with R
L from equation










5  Other government objectives, including achieving a particular stock level by selling
licensing fees and balancing their budget, are distinct possibilities, but are outside the scope
of the present paper.
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Optimal enforcement expenditure is found by maximising equation (10)
with respect to e, with R





e + nα′γ = 1 − αγ ′R
e − lsR
e. (12)
These two conditions, equations (11) and (12), can be interpreted in a
relatively straightforward manner. The marginal beneﬁt of harvesting, or
the left-hand-side of equation (11), is comprised of the direct additional
revenues from selling the last unit at the market price (p) and the indirect
additional revenues derived from: (i) the decrease in total harvesting costs
as a result of stock effects (dsh
L) and (ii) the increase in the price (ph) (each
generated by the negative relationship between legal harvesting and the
level of total poaching (that is, through R
L); and (iii) the reduction in the
habitat protection cost (ls), as a higher harvest implies a lower remaining
stock to conserve. The marginal cost of harvesting, the right-hand-side of
equation (11), is composed of the direct additional cost of harvesting the
last unit (d), the indirect costs of the lost revenues on all units sold at a
lower price because of a higher harvest (phh
L), the effects on total harvest-
ing costs from harvesting more (dsh
L), the additional habitat protection
costs (ls) and the expected loss in punishment revenues (αγ ′R
L) from the
consequent reductions in poaching (again, through R
L). Similarly, the left-
hand-side of equation (12) is the marginal beneﬁt of enforcement, which
consists of a higher price of (and revenue from) the harvested good (phh
L),
a lower unit harvesting cost (ds, from lower poaching through R
e), and a
higher probability of catching poachers and, therefore, higher expected
ﬁnes (nα′γ). The right-hand-side of equation (12) is the marginal cost of
enforcement, which consists of the expenditure itself, the expected lost ﬁne
revenue (αγ ′), and the higher habitat protection required (ls) from less poach-
ing (again through R
e).
From equation (11), the legal harvest may be zero and only poaching
may occur when, among other factors, habitat protection is particularly
expensive or legal harvesting costs are prohibitively high, poaching is
signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient, or poaching levels are high (so that the price is
low relative to costs, as is potentially the case when the number of poachers,
n, is large).
To  illustrate the relationship between legal and poaching harvests, con-
sider the example provided in ﬁgures 1–3.
6 Figure 1 shows the legal harvest
and total poaching under different numbers of poachers in the market. As
6  The example provided is for illustrative purposes only. See Appendix for details. All of
the conclusions and inferences that follow are general and, therefore, not restricted to the
example in question. Partial output and enforcement levels are permitted for simplicity.Wildlife trade 621
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the number of poachers increases, there is little change in the legal harvest,
but poaching increases; asymptotically converging to the legal harvest (so
that the total of legal and poaching harvests is strictly increasing in the
number of poachers). At low numbers of poachers (n), individual poachers
Figure 1 Legal and poaching harvests with pure-return objective and identical costs (identical
harvesting costs but positive government habitat protection costs).
Figure 2 Legal and poaching harvests with pure-return objective and a cost advantage to
poachers.622 P.C. Missios
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utilise their (non-collusive) market power to trade-off units poached for
higher product prices. However, as competition increases among poachers,
this trade-off disappears and the reaction of total poaching to legal
harvesting approaches negative one (that is, if poaching was perfectly com-
petitive, a decrease in legal harvesting by one unit would increase poaching
by the same amount, according to equation (7)), and enforcement becomes
less effective, from equation (9).
7 Nonetheless, the ﬁrst move of the govern-
ment in selecting a particular legal harvest level prior to poachers selecting
their own harvests ensures a legal harvest that is higher than total poaching
for any ﬁnite number of poachers. Figure 2 shows the same situation, but
with poachers having a cost advantage over legal harvesters: such as when
harvesting costs are the same, but the government incurs signiﬁcant habitat
protection costs. Here, the lower harvesting costs may allow poachers to
overcome the ﬁrst-mover advantage of legal harvesters and earn higher
proﬁts, as poaching levels can exceed legal harvests.
Bans on legal harvesting can be implemented under agreements such as
CITES, or can be unilaterally enforced by importing or exporting coun-
tries. In the context of the model, suppose initially that the relationship
between the probability of catching poachers and illegal harvests remains
the same after the implementations of a ban. A ban on legal harvesting will
limit h
L to zero, promoting poaching through the (higher) price of output.
However, to ascertain the overall impact on poaching, we must examine the
impact on enforcement as well. Under a ban, poachers collectively harvest
h
P to satisfy equation (4), as previously. The relationship between h
P and e
(that is, R
e) remains negative and unchanged from equation (8), and the
government simply maximises the net expected return earned from enforce-
ment less habitat protection costs, or:
(13)
Therefore, enforcement is chosen according to:
nα′γ = 1 − αγ ′R
e − lsR
e, (14)
which differs from its counterpart, equation (12), in that it excludes the
beneﬁts of a higher price of the harvested good (p) and lower land protection
7  Enforcement becomes less effective here because the small individual poacher’s harvest
under competition reduces the expected punishment more than proportionally because of
the convexity of the punishment function. If the expected punishment was linear in the











  −−Wildlife trade 623
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
costs (ls). Therefore, for the same poaching harvest, enforcement has a
smaller marginal beneﬁt and unchanged marginal cost and, therefore,
would decrease after a ban. However, the increased poaching associated
with the reduction in legal harvesting increases the marginal beneﬁt of
enforcement and decreases its marginal cost, pushing enforcement upwards.
These two opposite effects generate two possibilities. If the reaction of total
poaching choice to the legal harvest (R
L) is relatively large, both poaching
and enforcement could increase as a result of a trade ban. Conversely,
when enforcement is highly effective and legal harvest changes have
small effects on poaching choice (R
e is low, such as when the number of
poachers is small), enforcement increases and the poaching harvest
decreases. Both cases, however, would result in higher stock levels than
before the ban. In each case, total poaching, in general, is less than the sum
of legal and illegal harvesting that result in the absence of a ban, and, as
such, trade bans can be said to be more conservative than when permitting
legal harvesting.
Once a ban is instituted, however, illegal products cannot enter countries in
the guise of legal goods, and a ban may, therefore, have the effect of increasing
the probability of catching poachers, even if enforcement and poaching levels
do not change, say from α(e) to θ(e), where θ(x) > α(x) and θ′(x) > α′(x)
for all x > 0. In other words, the enhancement of the enforcement technology
may serve to rotate the probability function upwards. In this case, a ban
would have the additional positive effect of increasing enforcement effective-
ness, as the reaction of total poaching to enforcement becomes:
(15)
At the same time, the marginal cost of enforcement increases (because
of fewer ﬁnes and higher habitat protection costs), and this implies less
enforcement effort. Hence, two conﬂicting effects on total poaching ensue: a
lower enforcement level (e), but more effective enforcement (a higher R
e).
Therefore, it is possible that total poaching falls, even with lower enforcement,
as long as the change in the probability of catching poachers is sufﬁciently
large.
4. Domestic and external conservation beneﬁts
When a government takes into account that private individuals may hold
non-use values or species may provide indirect beneﬁts not captured in
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with trade restrictions may make them preferred over the free market.
8 In
such a case, the poaching reaction function is unchanged from equation
(4), but the government maximises a joint objective, such as:
U(E(π
L), s), (16)
which is assumed, for simplicity, to be additively separable and quasilinear
in expected proﬁts or, equivalently, that the marginal utility of proﬁts is un-
affected by the stock level. The social value function can then be written as:
U = ξE(π
L) + v(s), (17)
where  ξ  is the constant, positive weight placed on expected proﬁts, and
v′ > 0 and v′′ ≤ 0, or there is positive but diminishing marginal utility from
the stock level. Given that poachers react to their harvest and enforcement
level according to equation (7) and (9), respectively, the legal harvest is
chosen according to:
(18)
8  The market here, except for enforcement, is unregulated in the sense that no taxes or
other measures can be employed to correct the market failure.
Figure 3 Stock levels under pure proﬁt and stock-and-return objectives.
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and enforcement according to:
(19)
Compared to the proﬁt-maximising choices of the previous section, the vari-
ation here is generated by: (i) the additional marginal cost of harvesting in equa-
tion (18) in the amount of the utility lost from increased harvesting and the
resulting stock decrease, v′/ξ, net of the effects of the resulting reduction
in poaching (that is, through R
L); and (ii) the utility gain from enforcement
in equation (19), generated by reduced poaching (that is, through R
e). The
presence of the stock in the objective function, therefore, serves to decrease
legal harvesting and increase enforcement. While the former increases poach-
ing, the latter tends to decrease it. The overall effect depends on these relative
changes, so that poaching increases if enforcement is particularly ineffective
(implying that the change in the marginal cost with a ban is small). Any
increase in the level of total poaching does not exceed the reduction in legal
harvesting, and the stock level is higher relative to that under pure proﬁt
maximisation, as illustrated in ﬁgure 3. Even with identical costs, this implies
that poaching may well exceed the legal harvest, depending on the number
of poachers (n), as the government reduces its own harvest to ensure a higher
stock level despite the resulting higher poaching harvest.
With a trade ban, optimal enforcement is such that:
(20)
which differs again from the proﬁt-maximising case in that there is an addi-
tional beneﬁt derived from the larger stock as poaching falls. This would
imply that enforcement would be higher than with a ban and no existence
values. Lower poaching would result as well.
Alternatively, and potentially more importantly, we may consider a situation
in which existence values for a species are not held by local individuals but
by those in other countries, as in the case when domestic individuals have
more urgent concerns than the survival of a particular neighbouring species
(higher demand for environmental amenities is often associated with increasing
incomes). Under CITES, decisions regarding species are made during the
biannual Convention of Parties, in which the majority of members represent
countries other than those containing the species themselves. A perusal of
reservations towards species’ listings (objections to a particular classiﬁca-
tion or trade restriction) shows that most reservations are made by host
countries. The question then arises as to whether a ban on harvesting is
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superior to the mismanagement of the proﬁt-maximising resource manager:
a ban has the beneﬁt of a higher stock level, but the proﬁts from legal harv-
esting are absent. With no consideration for proﬁts a ban would prevail,
but the decisions of CITES are based on both proﬁts and stock levels. A
ban is only preferable in this scenario when marginal existence values (v′)
are high, equilibrium ﬁnes per unit are high and enforcement is quite effective,
so that poaching does not substantially increase with a ban, reducing the
stock so much that lost proﬁts are not offset.
5. Conclusions
The present paper attempts to formalise the interaction between poaching,
enforcement and legal harvesting. In doing so, the limited entry, illegal
activity literature is extended by endogenising all three of these variables. In
situations where poaching is not perfectly competitive, commitment to legal
harvests and enforcement levels in anticipation of poaching can serve to re-
duce poaching; and in cases of either highly effective and efﬁcient enforce-
ment or of a signiﬁcant legal harvesting cost advantage, possibly eliminate
poaching altogether. High opportunity costs for land, however, would signi-
ﬁcantly reduce the likelihood of this occurring, so that partial deterrence of
poaching by legal harvests would likely result. Depending on the nature of the
demand for the product derived from the species, the costs of harvesting and
the effectiveness of enforcement, the model described here illustrates that
legal harvesting may, in fact, be more effective at reducing poaching levels
than higher enforcement expenditures. This is certainly not always the case,
but a precommitment to legal harvesting does reduce poaching in general.
The reaction function for total poaching is downward sloping in both the
legal harvest and enforcement. With respect to legal harvesting, the slope
of the reaction function is greater than negative one, so that decreases in
legal harvests are only partially offset by increases in poaching. Optimal
legal harvests may be zero when habitat protection costs are high, poaching
has a signiﬁcant cost advantage, or the number of poachers is high. In gen-
eral, however, a combination of legal harvest and enforcement expenditure
yields higher returns than enforcement alone.
In order to regulate trade in endangered species, CITES has typically
employed trade bans and harvest quotas. When a government (or resource
manager) simply maximises the rents received from legal harvests, a trade
ban (or zero legal harvest) unambiguously reduces proﬁts. If the reaction
function of poaching is steep (poaching is quite sensitive to the legal
harvest), both poaching and enforcement increase as a result of a ban. If,
instead, enforcement is highly effective and legal harvests do not have large
impacts on total poaching (such as when the number of poachers is small),Wildlife trade 627
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a ban can result in higher enforcement and lower poaching. In any case, the
positive effectiveness of enforcement expenditures on poaching levels leads to
higher species stock levels with bans, as the increase in poaching does not
completely offset the reduced legal harvest. This higher stock level makes a ban
more appealing when a government is concerned with the stock level as well
as the returns from legal activity than under a proﬁt-maximising objective.
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Appendix
A numerical example was used to create ﬁgures 1–3. The choice of parameter
values was arbitrary and was meant to illustrate the theoretical results. To this
end, a linear inverse demand curve of the form P = A − b(h
L + h
P), a stock-
dependent cost function, c(s) = k(s0 − s)/s0, a concave probability function,
α = a(e)
1/2, and an exponential punishment function, γ = g(h
P/n)
2, were used,
with A, b, a, k and g being speciﬁed parameters. Individual and total poaching
harvests were found as a function of the government choice variables and,
consequently, the legal harvest was found to maximise the legal objective
subject to the individual and total poaching reaction functions. For the ﬁgures,
the ﬁxed number of poachers was varied to demonstrate the various potential
outcomes under different degrees of poaching competition.